As reported in the BusinessWeek Online article, “The Skilling Trap” (June 12, 2020), Jeffrey Skilling, former CEO of Enron, said on the courthouse steps, after being convicted of white-collar crimes that will send him to jail, probably for the rest of his life,

Gamblers' Ethics: Win Some, Lose Some
Gamblers' Ethics: Win Some, Lose Some

“Obviously I’m disappointed. But that’s the way the system works.”

The BusinessWeek article, went on to say:

… walking out of his trial into the prospect of decades of imprisonment, he stayed in character. He did not say that he was robbed of justice or express regret or defiance. He proved himself, considering the circumstances, a maestro of emotional detachment.

Jeff Skilling’s comments suggest a professional gambler who, having lost a fortune, shrugs and says,

“That’s the way the game is played. You win some, you lose some.”

It may be unfortunate and lamentable for society, but Jeff Skilling was simply telling the truth as he saw it, according to tenets of moral relativism learned at the Harvard Business School and his interpretation of corporate behavior observed while working as a consultant with McKinsey and Company.

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Stock buyback programs are a legalized form of market manipulation, sanctioned under SEC Rule 10b-18 and that serve to drive up the price of a company’s stock and to give false value to executive stock options — something that the SEC considers a “legitimate business reason” for rigging the market.

Virgil shows Dante the Greedy in Hell
Virgil shows Dante the Greedy in Hell

Companies disclose the board approval and the intended scope of a buyback operation, but not information regarding the specific timing of trades or the brokers involved.

In 2003, an attempt to improve disclosure of buyback operations, including the names of brokers, failed. Stock brokers protested and the SEC caved in to market insiders.

No Safe Harbor From Insider Trading Sanctions

As Rule 10b-18 now stands:

  • The issuer announces that it has authorized the repurchase of a certain number of shares, without setting the price or timing, or committing to a certain volume of transactions. Details of the buyback program and the broker involved are secret from the public.

  • If the price of the company stock should rise after the announcement of a buyback, an investor has no way of knowing whether the price increase is the result of the market manipulation, or in anticipation of the manipulation, or a legitimate reflection of increased intrinsic value of the stock.

  • Contemporaneous information on the buyback operation is material and secret. This is “inside information”, privy to executives of the issuer and to brokers involved in the buyback program. Disclosure of inside information is a crime, subject to prison.

  • Once a buyback operation is completed or abandoned, buying pressure on the issuers’ stock ceases and the stock often falls in value. Until publicly announced, information as to the completion or abandonment of a buyback program is also inside information, subject to criminal sanctions on improper disclosure.

To Whom Is Inside Information on Buybacks Valuable?

Obviously, an executive who wants to time the sale of his or her stock options to meet the peak price during the buyback program, needs to know the timing and details of the transactions. This gives the executive an advantage over ordinary investors, but the SEC does not seem concerned with this. There seem to be no special procedures to keep buyback transaction information secret from executives who might hold options and benefit from the program.

The manager of an investment fund can benefit greatly from inside information as to the timing a buyback program. With these details , the fund manager can buy the stock cheaply, before buybacks begin. After holding the stock until the final flurry of purchases by the issuer, the fund manager can sell at a nice profit at the top of the market as the program ends.

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By Q1 2006, stock repurchases by domestic non-financial corporations had multiplied to five times the level of 2000, the peak of the Great Bubble of the 1990s.

Fuel on the Fire
Fuel on the Fire

With buybacks accelerating at an annual rate of 25% throughout 2005, and with net corporate profits after taxes increasing only 5.5% a year, it is now probable, if recent buyback-option trends persist, that by 2009 — the eve of retirement of the Baby Boomer generation — corporate stock buybacks will surpass net corporate profits after taxes.

Manipulating stock prices upwards by repurchasing equities requires ever-increasing levels of profits.

However, since reduction in corporate reserves is the inevitable outcome of increasing stock buybacks, failing to invest in the future leads to lower profits and will eventually bring buybacks to an end.

The question is not whether buyback-option programs can persist, but rather how long?

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